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V. CONCLUSION
Because of the importance of mitigation evidence, the defense
lawyer must ensure that the evidence offered in mitigation is not used or
perceived as proof of the aggravating factor of future dangerousness.
Instructing the jury that mitigation evidence proffered by the defendant
is to be considered as such, and cannot be considered as proof of an
aggravating circumstance, is essential to avoiding the "two-edged sword"
dilemma referred to by Justice O'Connor in Peniy v. Lynaugh. The right
to present relevant mitigating evidence, have that evidence considered
and given effect, and to not have that evidence used to prove or to be
viewed as an aggravating circumstance is guaranteed by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. It is the
defense lawyer's duty and responsibility to assure that the defendant's
right is recognized.
APPLYING THE VIRGINIA CAPITAL STATUTE TO JUVENILES
BY: KEVIN ANDREW CLUNIS AND NICHOLAS VANBUSKIRK
I. INTRODUCTION
Virginia practitioners increasingly are facing cases where the
Commonwealth is seeking the death penalty against juvenile defendants.
These defendants sometimes are as young as fifteen years of age. The
most desirable outcome, of course, is to prevent the juvenile defendant
from ever having to face the possibility of the death penalty. This article
explores three ways in which the Virginia death penalty statute may be
challenged when it is applied against juvenile offenders. The first
challenge explains how the United States Supreme Court's decisions
preclude the application of the death penalty against fifteen year-old
offenders when, as under the Virginia scheme, the capital punishment
statute does not specify a minimum age. The second challenge, based on
the United States Supreme Court holdings in Stanford v. Kentucky l and
Wilkins v. Missouri2 , focuses on the inadequacy of Virginia's transfer
statutes where a defendant who is seventeen years or younger is being
certified to face a possible death sentence. The final challenge examines
why Virginia's statute allowing ajuvenile who is facing the death penalty
to waive her transfer hearing also runs afoul of Stanford and Wilkins.
II. THE STATUTE AS APPLIED TO MINORS
UNDER AGE SIXTEEN.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of "Cruel and
Unusual Punishment." In implementing the mandate of this clause, the
Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that differences exist which
must be accommodated in determining the rights and duties of children
as compared with those of adults. 3 Similarly, the legislatures in all fifty
states have specifically applied this mandate to distinguish the criminal
treatment of individuals under age sixteen.4 However, several states,
including Virginia, have provided for special certification procedures
that are used to authorize minors below the age of sixteen to stand trial
as adults. 5 When such procedures are used to certify minors charged with
capital murder and allow them to face the death penalty because the
capital statute does not require a minimum age for the imposition of the
1 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
2 Id. at 361.
3 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 822,823 (1988). See also Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,590-91 (1975). See case summary of Thompson,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 21 (1988).
4 Every State has adopted "a rebuttable presumption" that a person
under 16 "is not mature and responsible enough to be punished as an
adult," no matterhow minor the offense may be. See Thompson, 487 U.S.
at 825, n. 22 (1988).
5 Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269(A)(1982).
6 See Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-31 (1988), 19.2-264.2 to 19.264.5
(1990).
7 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
8 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,293 (1976);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-597 (1977); Edmund v. Florida,
death penalty,6 the Eighth Amendment casts grave doubt on the statute's
constitutionality.
TheSupreme Courthas held thatin applyingtheEighthAmendment's
"Cruel and Unusual Punishment" prohibition,judges must be guided by
the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.' 7 In performing that task, the Court looks to the work product
of state legislatures and sentencing juries and to the policies behind
society's acceptance of specific penalties in certain cases.
8
The Court applied this analysis in Thompson v. Oklahoma,9 when
it addressed the question of whether fifteen year-old offenders could be
subject to the death penalty. Like Virginia, the Oklahoma statutes
provided special procedures by which a "child" 10 could be tried as an
adult,11 and, as with the Virginia code, 12 the Oklahoma capital murder
statute did not state a minimum age. Citing Coker v. Georgia,13 a
plurality held that the imposition of the death penalty on an offender
under sixteen years of age always would be unconstitutional. 14
In arriving at its holding, the plurality reviewed "relevant legislative
enactments" and referred to a survey of "jury determinations" to support
its "judgement that such a young person is not capable of acting with the
degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty." 15 Citing
Bellotti v.Bairdt 6 and Eddings v. Oklahoma,17 the plurality endorsed the
proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a
juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. 18 The
Thompson plurality also identified data which it saw as establishing a
national consensus against subjecting a fifteen year-old to the death
penalty. At the time Thompson was decided, thirty-seven states had a
death penalty. Of these thirty-seven, eighteen states had a set minimum
age of sixteen or greater, 19 and no state had specifically set the age
minimum at less than age sixteen. 20 In addition, there were thirteen
states and the District of Columbia that did not allow the imposition of
the death penalty at all. Thus, the plurality found a strong national
consensus against the imposition of the death penalty against fifteen
year-old defendants.
In support of this national consensus theory, the Thompson Court
also relied on statistics showing the rarity of fifteen year-olds being
458 U.S. 782, 789-96 (1982).
9 487 U.S. at 820-21.
10 Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § I101(1)(Supp. 1987).
11 See Okla. Stat., tit. 10, § 11 12(b)(1981); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-
269 (1982).
12 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (1988).
13 433 U.S. at 592.
14 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838 (opinion of Stevens, Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun J.J.)
15 Id. at 822-23.
16 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
17 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
18 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834 (opinion of Stevens, Brennan,
Marshall and Blackmun, J.J.)
19 See id. at 829-30, n.30.
20 See id.
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sentenced to death or actually being executed. 21 These statistics showed
that of the 1,393 people sentenced to death between 1982 and 1986, only
five of them, including Thompson, were less than sixteen years old at the
time of the offense.22 Taken together with the fact that no one under the
age of sixteen has been executed since 1948, the plurality was "lead to the
unambiguous conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty on a
fifteen year-old offender is now generally abhorrent to the conscience of
[the] community." 23
Justice O'Connor cast the crucial fifth vote in Thompson rendering
the death penalty unconstitutional. In her concurring opinion, Justice
O'Connorjoined the plurality's belief "that a national consensus forbid-
ding the execution of any person for a crime committed before the age of
sixteen" existed. 24 However, she stopped short of adopting the theory as
a matter of constitutional law and instead focused on the actions of the
Oklahoma legislature. 25 Under the Oklahomastatute at issue, as with the
current Virginia code, a fifteen year-old became eligible for the death
penalty because of how two separate statutory provisions came together:
(1) special transfer proceedings allowed a fifteen year-old to be treated
as an adult in certain murder trials and (2) the capital murder statute was
silent as to a minimum age. Justice O'Connor pointed out that because
the imposition of the death penalty constituted a "quite separately"
contemplated legislative action distinct from certifying juveniles as
adults, considerable risk arose that the Oklahoma legislature did not
realize that its actions, when taken together, had subjected fifteen year-
olds to the death penalty.26 Justice O'Connor concluded that the
Oklahoma statute was of dubious constitutionality without at least some
specific legislative intent that the death penalty should be applied to
defendants whose ages were below age sixteen at the time of the
offense.
27
Since Thompson, several state courts have addressed the issue and
have vacated death sentences of fifteen year-old capital defendants
because of shortcomings in their own statutory schemes. Alabama, like
Oklahoma and Virginia, had a capital statute with no minimum age and
ajuvenile transfer statute that permitted fifteen year-olds to be treated as
adults in certain circumstances. 28 The Supreme Court of Alabama
vacated a fifteen year-old defendant's sentence of death based on Justice
O'Connor's reasoning that the legislature had failed to establish affirma-
tively its intention to have juveniles of that age subjected to the death
penalty.
29
Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to uphold the death
sentence of a fifteen year-old because there was no evidence that the
Louisiana Legislature made a conscious and deliberate decision to
impose the death penalty on those less than sixteen years old.30 As in
Virginia, the Louisiana statute permitted the automatic certification of
fifteen year-olds accused of murder, rape or robbery.3 1 Because auto-
matic certification affords even less protection than Thompson was
given by the Oklahoma statute that was struck down, the danger of
constitutional violation under such a scheme was even greater.
Finally, the Indiana Supreme Court vacated a fifteen year-old's
21 Id. at 832.
22 See Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 848-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
25 Id.
26 Id at 857.
27 Id. at 857-58.
28 See Ala. Code Ann. § 13 A-5-40(a)(3)(1975).
29 Flowers v. State, 586 So.2d 978, 979 (Ala. 1991).
30 State v. Stone, 535 So.2d 362 (La. 1988).
31 See La. Const. Art. 5 § 19 (1979).
32 Cooper v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1989).
33 See Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-1-1 (1971).
34 See Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-311; 16.1-269 (1982).
capital sentence because the court questioned the constitutionality of
executing ajuvenile under its capital statute.32 Like Virginia, theIndiana
statute provided no minimum age at the time of the defendant's of-
fense.
33
Thus, even under Justice O'Connor's more limited analysis,
Virginia's statute would be unconstitutional when applied to fifteen
year-olds. Like the Oklahoma statute in Thompson, the Virginia capital
statute is applicable to a fifteen year-old only by virtue of the separate
transfer statute without any evidence that the Virginia legislature in-
tended to make those offenders death eligible.34 The Commonwealth
would be hard pressed to make a compelling showing of the statutory
goals achieved by applying the capital statute to these young offenders
where there is no legislative intent that the statute even applied to them.
Under the Thompson plurality, applying the capital penalty to
fifteen year-olds is per se unconstitutional. 35 And since Thompson, the
number of states expressly declaring a minimum age greater than fifteen
has increased to a total of nineteen, 36 "with no state since Thompson
having declared a minimum age of less than sixteen years. However,
even if a per se ban is not found, because the Virginia legislature has not
demonstrated an intention for the death penalty to apply to fifteen year-
old offenders, the capital penalty is not applicable.
II. THE TRANSFER STATUTE IS INADEQUATE TO
PROVIDE INDIVIDUALIZED CONSIDERATION
IN CAPITAL CASES.
Virginia Code Section 16.1-269 permits the transfer of a juvenile
into the jurisdiction of the circuit court. That juvenile is subject to the
same criminal sanctions as an adult who had committed the same crime.
Virginia's capital murder statute sets no minimum age for execution. In
this way, a juvenile may stand trial and be sentenced to death under
Virginia's capital statute. Yet, Virginia's transfer statute fails to ad-
equately provide the individual consideration required in capital cases.
This failure is especially significant because of the added concerns
present when ajuvenile is the defendant. This inadequacy of the transfer
statute is a violation of the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and
unusual punishment.
The Eighth Amendment's proscription of "Cruel and Unusual
Punishment" is dictated by "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society. '37 Individualized consideration for
death eligibility is constitutionally required.38 The Supreme Court of the
United States has recognized the additional concerns present when
dealing with a juvenile defendant. The need for individualized consid-
eration increases:
But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to
influence and psychological damage. Our history is replete
with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in
35 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838 (opinion of Stevens, Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J.). The plurality stated, "we are not per-
suaded that the imposition of the death penalty for offenses committed
by persons under 16 years of age has made, or can be expected to make
any...contribution to the goals [of] capital punishment. It is nothing more
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering...and
thus unconstitutional punishment." Id. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 183 (1976)("Mhe sanction imposed cannot be so totally
without penologicaljustification that it results in the gratuitous infliction
of suffering")
36 Missouri has recently establish a minimum age of 16 for its
capital enalty. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.020 (Vernon 1990).
3 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
38 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)
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their early years, generally are less mature and responsible than
adults. Particularly 'during the formative years of childhood
and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspec-
tive, and judgement' expected of adults."
'39
A plurality of the court held in Stanford v. Kentucky40 that this
individual examination was one of the keys to trying juveniles in capital
cases: "The determinations required by juvenile transfer statutes to
certify ajuvenile for trial as an adult ensure individualized consideration
of the maturity and moral responsibility of sixteen and seventeen year-
old offenders before they are even held to stand trial as adults."4 1
Kentucky's transfer statute required the certifying court to examine the
sophistication and maturity of the juvenile offender in making its
decision whether to transfer the juvenile to stand trial as an adult.42
In contrast, Virginia's transfer statute is not as elaborate in its
protection. The Virginia statute allows the automatic certification for
certain offenders, including capital defendants, without the individual-
ized consideration of a transfer hearing.4 3 No transfer hearing means no
individualized findings and without these individualized findings, a
capital proceeding involving a juvenile lacks the emphasis on personal
culpability that has long been reflected in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence. 44 Moreover, even where a transfer hearing is held, the scope of
the inquiry is not as broad as that approved of by the United States
Supreme Court in Stanford.
Despite the Virginia statute's shortcomings when compared to the
transfer statutes in Stanford and Wilkins, the Virginia Supreme Court has
upheld Virginia's scheme. In Wright v. Commonwealth, the defendant
argued that although the juvenile court had made some findings (that
Wright was not mentally retarded, was not amenable to treatment, and
that society's interests required him to be placed under restraint), the
judge never made the crucial findings required by Stanford, that Wright's
maturity and moral responsibility were sufficient to allow the death
penalty to be imposed. 45 In rejecting the claim, the Virginia Supreme
Court reasoned that because such findings would take place later in the
proceeding, when the jury considers age as a mitigating factor, no
necessity existed to have those factors considered at the transfer hear-
ing.
46
The Wright court's holding ignores Stanford's emphasis on the
protections that an adequate juvenile transfer hearing must provide
before the death penalty can be sought against a juvenile. The Wright
holding, in turn, was premised in part on an earlier Virginia Supreme
Court holding in Thomas v. Commonwealth, in which the court had held
that ajuvenile could waive the transfer hearing altogether even where the
death penalty is being sought. The Thomas holding itself, however, is of
dubious constitutionality when considered in light of United States
Supreme Court rulings.
39 Eddings, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)(quotingBellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979)).
40 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
41 Id. at375.
42 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 208.170 (Michie 1982); The Missouri statute in
the companion case, Wilkins v. Missouri, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), had
similar provisions: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.071(6).
43 Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269 (A)(3)(b)(1988).
44 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 104.
45 Wright v.Commonwealth, Nos. 920810, 920811, 1993 Va.
III. VIRGINIA'S WAIVER STATUTE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Virginia Code Section 16.1-270 allows a juvenile to waive the
jurisdiction of juvenile court in certain cases. The statute provides:
At any time prior to commencement of the adjudicatory
hearing, a child fifteen years of age or older charged with an
offense which if committed by an adult could be punishable
by confinement in a state correctional facility, with the written
consent of his counsel, may elect in writing to waive the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court and have his case transferred
to the appropriate circuit court, in which event his case shall
thereafter be dealt with in the same manner as if he had been
transferred pursuant to 16.1-269.12. 47
The validity of this statute was challenged in Thomas v. Common-
wealth.4 8 The defendant argued the hearing was necessary to provide the
individual consideration required by the Constitution before a juvenile
can receive the death penalty. Thomas also argued that because the
language spoke of waiver where the crime was "punishable by confine-
ment," waiver should not be allowed where the sentence was death rather
than imprisonment.49 The Virginia Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ments, concluding that "the waiver provision is clearly applicable where
a juvenile is charged with a capital offense." 50 Arguing that the words
"could be punished" were intended to reflect a sentencing possibility,
rather than a sentencing fact, the court pointed out that capital murder can
be punishable not only through imposition of the death penalty but also
by imprisonment. They thus rejected Thomas' reading of the statute.
Instead of an attack based on statutory interpretation, the language
of Stanford should be used. Absent a transfer hearing, the individualized
findings of personal culpability required at pre-trial are impossible. A
waiver of this hearing prevents those necessary findings from being
made. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that added
considerations are present when dealing withjuveniles. 5 1 By permitting
a juvenile to waive a transfer hearing, the court overlooks this key
difference. The primary consideration in the capital case involving a
juvenile will be the age of the defendant. By relegating age to a
mitigating factor at trial, the court de-emphasizes that individualized
consideration by placing it alongside any number of mitigating factors.
The individualized consideration required by Stanford, to be meaning-
ful, must be set apart, both procedurally and chronologically. Voluntary
waiver precludes this and should not be permitted.
LEXIS 26 (Feb. 26, 1993).
46 Id. at *5 - *6..
47 Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-270 (1982).
48 Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1, 7,419 S.E. 2d 606 (1992).
See case summary of Thomas, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. I p.
43 (1992).
49 Id. at 7, 419 S.E.2d. at 610.
50 Id.
51 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. at 834.
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NARROWING THE SCOPE OF CAPITAL MURDER DURING THE
COMMISSION OF A ROBBERY:
WHEN MUST THE INTENT TO ROB ARISE?
BY: ROBERTA F. GREEN
I. INTRODUCTION
In Virginia, "the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any
person in the commission of robbery or attempted robbery while armed
with a deadly weapon" is capital murder. 1 While the statute is clear on
the relationship between killing during a robbery and capital murder,
Virginia case law has shown the statute to be more difficult to interpret
in terms of the time frame inherent in the phrase "in the commission of'
and in terms of the requisite intent. To capital defense attorneys, the
timing and intent distinctions are particularly important in that they offer
a window of opportunity for separating a killing from the robbery that
anchors it within the boundaries of capital murder. Therefore, this brief
article will outline Virginia case law on a killing "in the commission of
robbery" and will suggest arguments for counsel to raise in attempting to
narrow the scope of the capital murder statute.
II. CURRENT VIRGINIA CASE LAW
Branch v. Commonwealth,2 a non-capital case, is the landmark
case in this area. In Branch, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed a
second degree murder conviction and reversed a robbery conviction.
The facts of the case were as follows. Defendant Paul Preston Branch IH
was entertaining a number of friends at his home. One of the guests had
brought along a firearm, which Branch took from him before allowing
him to enter the house. Thereafter, Branch maintained control of the gun.
As the evening progressed, an argument broke out between two of the
guests, and Branch brandished the weapon in order to subdue one of the
combatants, Jeffrey Ryder. However, the weapon discharged, killing
Ryder almost immediately. Branch "told the others that 'it was an
accident,' a stance he maintained throughout police interrogation and at
trial. ' 3 Subsequently, in an effort to impede the identification of the
body, Branch and his assembled guests went through Ryder's clothing,
wallet and automobile. Branch burned the contents of Ryder's wallet,
and then he and one of the guests deposited the body across town. In
deciding that Branch failed to have the requisite intent for robbery, the
I Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(4) (1991). For a clear analysis of the
crime of robbery in Virginia (both as separate crime and as capital murder
predicate), see Mosely and Richardson, Robbery, Rape and Abduction:
Alone and As Predicate Offenses to Capital Murder, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1990).
2 225 Va. 91,300 S.E.2d 758 (1983).
3 Id. 93,300 S.E. 2d at 759.
4 172 Va. 615, 618, 1 S.E.2d 200, 301 (1939). See also Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 291, 163 S.E.2d 570 (1968).
5 Branch, 225 Va. at 94-5, 300 S.E.2d at 759.
6 Id.
7 Intent to steal.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 95, 300 S.E.2d at 760.
10 Branch, 225 Va. at 95, 300 S.E.2d at 760 (emphasis added).
The year before the Branch case, the court considered Whitley v.
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 286 S.E.2d 162 (1982), which also adds
meaning to the capital murder designation. Richard Lee Whitley was
convicted in the death of his neighbor on the charge of capital murder
during robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon. Id. at 66, 286
S.E.2d at 164 (citing Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (d) (1981). Whitley argued
court addressed two factors of particular importance: the principal
elements of robbery and the motive for the killing.
Citing Jones v. Commonwealth,4 the Branch court defined robbery
and then divided it into its three principal elements: the taking, the intent
to steal, and the violence or intimidation. 5 The court found that these
three elements must occur in a particular temporal sequence.6 That is,
the intent and the taking must exist simultaneously, and the violence must
occur before or at the time of the taking. Finally, the taking is not a
robbery unless the animusfurandi7 existed before or at the time of the
violence.8 Considering the facts before them, the court found that
robbery had not motivated Branch's act of violence and agreed that he
had taken the victim's wallet only in an attempt to cover up the crime.9
The court held that "the violent killing and the unlawful taking were two
separate acts, performed for entirely different reasons."1 0
The Virginia Supreme Court has recently clarified its position on
robbery and murder in George v.Commonwealth,1 1 in the process
distinguishing the facts of Branch from the facts in the case before it.
Defendant Michael Carl George was convicted of capital murder in the
commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon and was
sentenced to death. The victim in the case, a fifteen-year-old boy, had
been molested and murdered, and his motorcycle had been stolen.
Finding that the murder was inextricably related "in time, place and
causal connection to the robbery," the court held that the "killing became
part of the same criminal enterprise as the robbery.... George was
motivated by the dual purpose of molesting [the victim] sexually and
robbing him."' 12 Therefore, the court affirmed George's conviction.
13
Together Branch and George serve as guides for distinguishing
when a robbery and a killing are two separate acts and when they are part
of the same criminal enterprise. In these cases, among others, the
Virginia Supreme Court has made clear that the determination of capital
murder premised on robbery relies on several factual distinctions. Where
the facts support the designation of the robbery and the murder as two
unrelated acts, the robbery subsection of the capital murder statute will
not apply. Conversely, where the facts and defendant's motivation show
the robbery and the killing as part of the same criminal enterprise, the
that the taking (stealing his neighbor's car) had been an after-thought,
that his intent had been solely to kill his neighbor. While the Virginia
Supreme Court in Whitley stated that "violence or intimidation must
precede orbe concomitant with the taking," id. at 73, 286 S.E.2d at 166,
as robbery is a crime against the person of the victim rather than against
property, the court found that a corpse remains a "person" if the "'taking
occurs minutes after the victim is killed,' so it is immaterial that the
victim is dead when the theft occurs." Id. (quoting Ridley v. Common-
wealth, 219 Va. 834, 836, 252 S.E.2d 313, 314 (1979)). See also
Harward v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 363,330 S.E.2d 89 (1985) (provid-
ing dicta that a killing "before, during, and after" a felony falls within "in
the commission of' the felony). Therefore, finding a strict temporal
analysis unnecessary, the Whitley court went on to consider the motive
for the killing, i.e., "whether robbery was the motive for the killing."
Whitley, 223 Va. at 73, 286 S.E.2d at 166. The Whitley court approved
the use of circumstantial evidence for proving motive and found that
Whitley had been specifically motivated for both the killing and the
robbing. Id.
1 242 Va. 264, 411 S.E.2d 12 (1991).
12 Id. at 280,411 S.E.2d at 21 (emphasis added).
13 Id. at 285, 411 S.E.2d at 24.
